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Large-scale collection of human behavioral data by companies
raises serious privacy concerns. We show that behavior captured
in the form of application usage data collected from smartphones
is highly unique even in very large datasets encompassing millions
of individuals. This makes behavior-based re-identification of users
across datasets possible. We study 12 months of data from 3.5 mil-
lion users and show that four apps are enough to uniquely re-identify
91.2% of users using a simple strategy based on public information.
Furthermore, we show that there is seasonal variability in unique-
ness and that application usage fingerprints drift over time at an av-
erage constant rate.
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Tracking behavior is a fundamental part of the emergingbig-data economy, allowing companies and organizations
to segment, profile and understand their users in increasingly
greater detail. Modeling context and interests of users has
proven to have various advantages: products can be designed
to better fit customers’ needs; content can be adapted; and
advertising can be made more relevant (1–6). Efficient user
modeling requires the collection of large-scale datasets of hu-
man behavior, which has led to a growing proportion of human
activities to be recorded and stored (7). Today, most of our
interactions with computers are stored in a database, whether
it is an e-mail, phone call, credit-card transaction, Facebook
like, or online search, and the rate of information growth is ex-
pected to accelerate even further in the future (8). These rich
digital traces can be compiled into detailed representations of
human behavior and can revolutionize how we organize our so-
cieties, fight diseases, and perform research; however, they also
raise serious privacy concerns (9–16). For example, Narayanan
et al. demonstrated the feasibility of inferring political views
of IMDb users through re-identification of movie ratings (17).
Another infamous case is the hacking (and eventual erasure of
personal data) of multiple accounts of a journalist, which was
carried out by the attacker being able to connect two different
databases (18).
The ubiquity and sensing capabilities of mobile phones
together with our seemingly symbiotic relationship to them,
renders these devices good tools for tracking and studying
human behavior (19, 20). Mobile phones are ubiquitous and
have permeated nearly every human society: in the year 2015
98.3% of the world’s population had a mobile subscription (21).
Mobile phones have transformed the way people access the in-
ternet as well: today the majority of traffic to web pages stems
from mobile devices rather than from desktop computers (22),
making advertisers target mobile phones to a higher degree.
With the standard methods based on cookies for identifying
customers not being used in smartphone apps, along with the
rising usage of ad-blockers among users (23), advertisers and
so-called data brokers are now targeting smartphone applica-
tions to replace the rich data cookies provided in the past.
Advertisement identifiers are one such ID embedded in applica-
tions, but they do not allow data brokers to track users across
multiple applications or devices, and they can even be reset
by the user. Application usage behavior, however, cannot be
cleared, and it is hard (and in many cases not feasible) to be
changed or manipulated by users. This creates an economic
incentive for global population tracking of application usage.
This tracking is in conflict of users’ perception of permissible
usage of data (24). Also, in general, users are not knowledge-
able enough about what data is collected about them to make
an informed decision (25).
A majority of the online services people interact with on a
daily basis collect personal information and sell the data to
data brokers (third parties) (26). In a recent report released
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, it was shown that
data broker companies obtain vast amounts of personal data,
which they further enrich with additional online and offline
sources, and re-sell these improved datasets to the highest
bidder, typically without the explicit consent or knowledge of
the users (27). According to U.S. privacy laws, data is consid-
ered anonymous if it does not contain personally identifiable
information (PII) such as name, home address, email address,
phone number, social security number, or any other obvious
identifier. As a result, it is legal for companies to share and sell
anonymized versions of a dataset. However, as studies have
shown, the mere absence of PII in a dataset does not neces-
sarily guarantee anonymity due to the fact that it is relatively
easy to compromise the privacy of individuals (11, 17, 28).
Human behavior, although imbued with routines, is in-
herently diverse. Previous work has shown that 99.4% of
smartphone users have unique app usage patterns and estab-
lished the viability of using apps as markers of human identity,
similar in application to fingerprints in forensic science (29–31).
It has further been demonstrated that the software infrastruc-
ture we use to access the Internet can be used to identify
users (10). The digital breadcrumbs we leave online can be
used to infer many aspects of our lives. It has been shown
for example that age, gender, relationship status, education
level, political beliefs, sexual orientation, religion, and even
personality can be predicted from Facebook likes (32, 33), or
based on the apps people use on their smartphones (34–36).
Human mobility traces has been shown to be highly unique
and research has further shown that 4 spatio-temporal points
are sufficient to re-identify a majority of individuals (11).
This study demonstrates how easy it is to uniquely identify
individuals from their smartphone usage patterns given only a
handful of data points, and investigates the temporal patterns
of uniqueness, revealing that humans are easier to identify
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during certain periods of the year. We define identification as
matching a behavior pattern against an (anonymous) quasi-
identifier consisting of a similar pattern. In the dataset we
use, no further information can be gained about the user
beyond matching two patterns. However, in a real world
scenario, an attacker could use this method for connecting
two datasets to learn new information about the re-identified
user, e.g. email address, age, or gender, depending on the data
available to the attacker. Our study focuses on applications
(apps) — small software programs which users can download
to their smartphones, and which provide a near unlimited
range of functions, from simple functions such as flashlights
or calculators to more advanced—artificial intelligence like—
functions. Each new phone comes with a set of apps pre-loaded
by the manufacturer, but a user is free to customize their device
to suit their specific needs, as such users have access to millions
of apps on app stores such as Google Play (approx. 2.8 million
apps) (37).
Results
Uniqueness of human behavior. To evaluate the likelihood of
identifying individuals within smartphone usage data we use
a dataset that spans 12 months (Feb. 1st 2016 to Jan. 31st
2017) and encompasses 3.5 million people using in total 1.1
million unique apps. We have chosen to disregard phone
vendor specific apps, such as alarm clock apps, built-in phone
dialer apps, etc. and only focus on apps that are downloadable
from Google Play. From this we form app fingerprints for
each user, i.e. a binary vector containing information about
which apps the user has used for every month. We only
consider apps actually used by a user in a month, not apps
that were installed but never used. Figure 1 illustrates the
typical patterns of app usage, with individuals continuously
changing their app-fingerprint over the course of a year by
trying out new apps and ceasing to use others. As such, app-
fingerprints slowly drift over time, with the average rate of
change being roughly constant between consecutive months
(Figure S1). In combination with fingerprints drifting, the
number of apps people use on their smartphones is constant
over time as well, suggesting that humans have a limited
capacity for interacting, navigating, and managing the plethora
of services and social networks offered by smartphones (Figure
S2). This limiting effect has been observed in other aspects
of life such as interactions among people (38) or geo-spatial
exploration (39).
The risk of re-identifying individuals is estimated by means
of unicity (11, 14). Here, re-identification corresponds to
successful assignment of an app-fingerprint to a single unique
user in our dataset. This does not entail that we can directly
get the real identity of a person, such as name, address, e-mail,
social security number, etc. This, however, would become
possible if this knowledge is cross-referenced with other data
sources, which there unfortunately has been countless examples
of (17, 40–43). Given an individual’s app-fingerprint, unicity
quantifies the number of apps needed to uniquely re-identify
that person; the fewer apps we need the more unique a person
is and vice versa. Given a dataset of app-fingerprints and set
of apps i, j and k, a user u is uniquely identifiable if that user,
and only that user, in the dataset has used apps i, j and k, i.e.
matching the fingerprint of user u. In our dataset we evaluate
uniqueness as the percentage of users we can re-identify using
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Fig. 1. Smartphone usage patterns change over time, with users continuously
changing which apps they use. This study is based on smartphone app-fingerprints of
3,556,083 individuals. For each month between February 2016 and January 2017, we
retrieve the list of apps a person has used during the period (nmonth = 23 apps per
person per month on average, or nyear = 76 apps on average during the full 12-month
period). App-fingerprints are represented as a sparse user × app × month tensor,
with 1 indicating a person has used an app during a specific month, 0 otherwise. To
look at longer time-windows, we aggregate entries according to a maximum value
heuristic and retain entries if they are greater than zero.
n number of apps.
To attack the dataset without any prior knowledge of the
system itself, the most realistic strategy is to pick apps at
random. Figure 2A shows the efficiency of this type of random
sampling of apps, with 21.8% of users being re-identified from
using 4 apps. Although this value means only 1 of every 5
individual can be re-identified, it is surprisingly high given
that we only use binary features (that is, has the user used the
app or not) and have no information regarding when an app
was used or for how long—features which would only make
fingerprints more unique. In case of a real attack, however,
the above results might give the general public a false sense of
security as it is possible to use free, publicly available informa-
tion to formulate an attack strategy that greatly outperforms
the random strategy.
The popularity of apps follows a heavy-tailed distribu-
tion (44) (and see Figure S3); a few apps are used by millions
or even billions of individuals, while an overwhelming majority
of apps only have a couple of users. All this information is
available on Google Play from where it is possible to retrieve by
automatic means, or it can be purchased from vendors such as
AppMonsta. Because this information is so easily attainable,
we formulate a strategy that takes the user base of apps (pop-
ularity of apps) into account, starting with the least used apps:
the popularity strategy. Rather than using the popularity in
terms of downloads on Google Play, we use the popularity
counted as the number of users that use an app in our dataset
(see Methods for details). A real-world re-identification attack
strategy could use the Google Play download numbers for each
app to reduce the amount of computation required. Figure
2B shows that just using 2 apps with the popularity strategy
greatly outperforms the random strategy, and using 4 apps,
we are able to re-identify 91.2% of users.
A B
Fig. 2. Uniqueness of smartphone app-fingerprints given n number of apps. (A)
Selecting apps at random is not an efficient way of identifying individuals and achieves
a modest re-identification rate of 21.8% when using 4 apps. (B) Using freely available
outside information from Google Play to attack the problem yields significantly higher
rates of re-identifications, 91.2% when using 4 apps. Error bars denote one standard
deviation. App-fingerprints are constructed from the full 12 months of data, and
99.7% of individuals within our dataset have a unique fingerprint.
Seasonal variability of anonymity. Human lives, routines and
behaviors evolve over time (39, 45, 46), and therefore individual
app-fingerprints might become harder (or easier) to identify.
To quantify the seasonal variability of uniqueness, we construct
monthly fingerprints for all individuals and evaluate anonymity
using the unicity framework. Figure 3 shows the fraction of
individuals that are re-identifiable per month, and reveals an
increased fraction of identifications for June, July, and August—
months which are typically considered vacation months. The
increase in uniqueness is independent of how we select apps
(random, or by popularity). In fact, during these three months
the process of identifying individuals from randomly selected
apps is respectively 14.8% and 18.4% more effective when
using 5 and 10 apps. For the popularity scheme, we note
6.8% and 8.0% higher rates of identifications when using 5
and 10 apps. The increase in identifiability stems from a
combination of related behavioral changes (Figure S4). Apps
related to categories such as travel, weather, sports, and health
& fitness gain popularity during the summer months (June,
July, August), related to people traveling and downloading
apps that help them navigate new cities, using fitness apps to
motivate them to exercise more, and using apps that enable
them to follow global sports events such as the 2016 UEFA
European Championship in football (soccer). Simultaneously,
apps related to categories such as education and business
become less popular. This suggests an interplay between our
physical behavior and our app-fingerprint, indicating that
when we change our geo-spatial routines by traveling and
exploring new places, we also change our app usage. This
change in phone behavior makes our app-fingerprints more
unique and easier to identify.
Hiding in the crowd. Our dataset is limited to 3.5 million users,
similar in size to a small country, but how will uniqueness
change as more users are added (increased sample-size)? Will
it become possible to hide in the crowd? More precisely, how
does the population size affect the extent to which a specific
A B
Fig. 3. Seasonal variations of re-identifiable app-fingerprints over 12 months. The
fraction of individuals which we can re-identify by using n apps (1-10) changes from
month to month, revealing that uniqueness has a temporal component, and that
people are more unique during summer. This is independent of whether apps are
selected using: (A) a random heuristic or (B) an attack scheme. Compared to Figure 2,
the fraction of re-identified individuals per month is lower because we have segmented
behavior into monthly fingerprints as compared to constructing fingerprints from 12
months of data. Uniqueness is rescaled according to the set size of apps present
within each month (see Figure S5).
app-fingerprint remains unique. That is, as more and more
users are added to our sample, does the likelihood to observe
multiple individuals with identical fingerprints also increase?
This corresponds to an inverse k-anonymity problem (28),
where one needs to estimate the number of users that should
be added in order to increase the overall anonymity of the
dataset. (Bearing in mind that overall anonymity is not a
good measure for the sensitivity of individual traces.) To
understand the effect of sample-size on unicity, we first slice
our dataset into smaller subsamples and use it to estimate
the uniqueness for sample sizes ranging from 100,000 to 3.5
million individuals. Figure 4A reveals that sample size has a
large effect on the re-identification rate when selecting apps
using a random heuristic. Considering napps = 5, the average
re-identification rate decreases from 45.89% for a sample size
of 1 million individuals to 37.33% for 2 million individuals and
32.09% for the full sample of 3.5 million people. The attack
scheme is considerably less affected (Figure 4B). For napps = 5
we find that the re-identification rates are respectively 96.60%,
94.23% and 92.72% for sample sizes of 1, 2 and 3.5 million
individuals. As such, increasing the sample size by 250%
(from 1 to 3.5 million individuals) only reduces uniqueness by
approximately 4 percent-points.
In order to estimate uniqueness for sample sizes larger than
the study population we extrapolate results from Figure 4B for
napps = 5. We express uniqueness of fingerprints using multiple
functional forms including: power-laws (∼ xγ), exponentials
(∼ exp(γx)), stretched exponentials (∼ exp(xγ)), and linear
functions (∼ x), where x denotes the sample size and γ is a
scaling factor. The stretched exponential and power-law show
the highest agreement with the data (Figure S6), and roughly
suggest that 5 apps are enough to re-identify 75%–80% of
individuals for 10 times larger samples (35 million individuals).
Although the applied analysis displays high uncertainty with
regards to extrapolations, it illustrates the observation that
increasing the population size does not help us in hiding in
the crowd (that is, uniqueness is not a characteristic of small
sample sizes).
A B
Fig. 4. Identifying fingerprints across data-samples with varying population sizes.
Fingerprints are constructed from 12 months of data. The uniqueness of individual
fingerprints is reduced (lower re-identification rates) as we increase the sample-size
independently of whether apps are selected: (A) randomly or (B) according to the
attack heuristic. The magnitude of the change, however, varies greatly different
between the two heuristics. Results show in both panels are calculated from multiple
realizations of the data (see Materials and Methods section).
Discussion
Phone behavior is different from credit card traces and mobile
phone mobility data in that the ease with which data can
be collected, and any Android app can request permission
to access your app history. We reviewed apps with more
than 100,000 downloads which request the ‘retrieve running
apps’ permission on Android, and that are free (no price
or in app purchases). Out of these 40 apps 31 contain ads.
There are 15 apps that belong to the Personalization or Tools
category, mostly anti-virus or launcher apps, which may need
the permission to provide their features. For the other 25
apps, we found no features in the app that would motivate
requesting this permission. Some of these apps are from major
phone vendors whose privacy policy says they may share data
with third parties.
The economic incentives, the easy and global scale of col-
lecting and trading this data without users’ knowledge creates
some serious concerns, especially since this practice is in vio-
lation of users’ expectations or knowledge (24, 25). The EU
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may be a first
step towards addressing these concerns through regulation,
since it does mention unicity (47) and applies globally to
data about any EU citizen. Our conclusion from this study
is that application usage data should be considered personal
information, since it is a unique fingerprint.
This study was performed using app usage data collected
from Android phones from a single vendor only. As phone
vendor specific apps were disregarded in the analysis, we expect
the results to generalize across all Android devices. Further,
we have no reason to believe that app usage behaviour and
uniqueness is fundamentally different for individuals using iOS
devices compared to Android users.
Materials and Methods
The dataset. We use a dataset that spans 12 months, from Feb. 1st
2016 to Feb. 1st 2017, and contains monthly app-fingerprints for
3,556,083 individuals with pseudonymized app and user identifiers.
Each fingerprint is a binary vector composed of the apps a person
has used during a month. We do not consider apps that are installed
but unused. We further disregard phone vendor specific apps such
as: alarm clock, phone dialer, settings etc. and only focus on apps
that are downloadable from Google Play. This removes vendor bias,
and makes re-identification harder. The users are selected from
major markets in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Thus, the impact
of regional variations on uniqueness due to local applications is
smaller than if we had sampled users from anywhere in the world.
In total, the number of unique apps in the dataset is 1,129,110,
and each individual in the dataset uses at least 3 apps per month.
Data collection is approved by the Sony Mobile Logging Board and
written consent in electronic form has been obtained for all study
participants according to the Sony Mobile Application Terms of
Service and the Sony Mobile Privacy Policy. Raw data cannot be
shared publicly on the web, but we offer the possibility to reproduce
our results starting from raw records by spending a research visit
at Sony Mobile Communications.
Estimating uniqueness. To estimate the uniqueness of app-
fingerprints, we apply the unicity framework (11) on k samples
of 10,000 randomly selected individuals. For each individual we se-
lect n apps (without replacement) from the person’s app-fingerprint.
With the popularity based attack, apps with low user base are
selected to increase the uniqueness of the app usage pattern. The
person is then said to be unique if they are the only individual in the
dataset whose app-fingerprint contains those apps. In cases where
n is larger the the total length of a person’s app-fingerprint we
instead select min(n, |fingerprint|) number of apps. Uniqueness for
a sample ki is then estimated as the fraction of the users that have
unique traces. Overall uniqueness is the average of the s samples,
and error-bars are given by the standard deviation. We use s = 20.
Subsampling the dataset. To quantify the relation between sample
size and uniqueness, we subsample the dataset by selecting a fraction
of the original dataset. For each sample si we estimate uniqueness
using the above methodology. To account for selection bias we
estimate uniqueness as the average of multiple realizations of a
sample size. We use 20 realizations for sample sizes between 100,000
- 500,000, 10 realizations for samples between 600,000 - 900,000,
and 5 realizations for sample sizes above 1,000,000 individuals.
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The data was collected using a pre-loaded app recommender app on Xperia phones. Data collection is approved by the Sony Mobile
Logging Board and written consent in electronic form has been obtained for all study participants according to the Sony Mobile Application
Terms of Service and the Sony Mobile Privacy Policy.
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Fig. S1. Distributions show the change in app fingerprint over time. The change is measured as Jaccard distance between a users fingerprint in one month and the next. Left,
change between consecutive months, e.g. February and March (denoted March), March and April (denoted April), etc. Right, Difference between fingerprint in February 2016
compared to other months, indicating a drift over time.
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Fig. S2. Average number of apps per user per month. The median is also plotted for comparison.
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Fig. S3. Distribution of populatity of apps, i.e. the number of individuals using an app. Estimated across the entire dataset. Distribution clearly displays a long-tail.
Function Pseudo R2 a b γ
axγ + b 0.939 -0.031 0.989 0.504
a exp(xγ) + b 0.940 -0.022 1.017 0.261
a exp(γx) + b 0.931 0.066 0.914 -0.388
ax+ b 0.908 -0.014 0.975 -
Table S1. Regression values.
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Fig. S4. Fraction of apps per category. Apps are divided into popular Google play categories and figure shows the fraction of app that belong to each category over time.
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Fig. S5. Seasonable variations of uniqueness over time for the random scheme (left) and the popularity heuristic (right). Curves are rescaled according to u˜(t) = u(t)|A|t/|A|t=0 ,
where u(t) is the uniqueness at month t, and |A|t is the number of apps at time t. With t = 0 denoting the first month of the dataset, February 2016.
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Fig. S6. Extrapolated uniqueness. Fit of different functional forms (see Table S1) to the uniqueness curve for napps = 5 when selecting apps using the popularity heuristic.
Closes agreement with data is achieved by the stretched exponential and power law functional forms.
